In recent years, there has been renewed interest in the yield curve (or alternatively, the term premium) as a predictor of future economic activity. In this paper, we re-examine the evidence for this predictor, both for the United States, as well as European countries. We examine the sensitivity of the results to the selection of countries, and time periods. We find that the predictive power of the yield curve has deteriorated in recent years. However there is reason to believe that European country models perform better than non-European countries when using more recent data. In addition, the yield curve proves to have predictive power even after accounting for other leading indicators of economic activity.
Introduction
Over three years ago, several observers noted the inversion of the yield curve in the United States. That event sparked a resurgence in the debate over the usefulness of the yield curve as an indicator of future economic activity, with an inversion indicating a slowdown (and in some formulations, a recession). The inverted yield curve as recession indicator, while common in the United States, is not widely used in other countries. Moreover, in the most recent episode, there was widespread conviction that --in light of the increased credibility ascribed to monetary policy --the yield curve no longer served as a useful early warning signal for growth slowdowns. Figure 1 displays the yield spread, the difference between long and short term government interest rates, through time for the United States and select European countries.
The yield spread dips before each recession period and turns negative for all but one, including the recession beginning in 2007. For European countries, the relationship is not as consistent but there does appear to be some level of coincidence.
The motivation for studying the yield spread is of course manifold. First, policy makers often need to make decisions today, based on expectations regarding future economic conditions. Although policymakers rely on a range of data and methods in forecasting future conditions, movements in the yield curve have in the past proved useful, and could still represent a useful additional tool.
Second, variations in the correlations between asset prices and economic activity might inform debates regarding the workings of the macroeconomy. The fact that it works for some countries, and not others, might be suggestive of certain channels being important, to the exclusion of others. A similar sort of reasoning applies to examining the goodness of fit over different time periods.
While there is already a voluminous literature on the subject of yield curves and US economic activity, we nonetheless believe now is an opportune time to re-examine the evidence. This conviction is rooted in two developments.
The first is the advent of the euro in 1999. The creation of a more integrated European bond market, and increased economic linkages on the real side, suggests that the old historical links (or nonlinks, as the case may be) between the interest rates and output might have changed. Yet, until recently, there had not been a sustained and significant downturn in the European economy post-EMU, and hence little opportunity to test the predictive power of the yield curve in this context.
The second is the "conundrum", i.e., the failure of long-term interest rates to rise along with the short-term policy rate, as the Fed Funds rate rose during 2004-05. Some people ascribed this phenomenon to the disappearance of risk, variously associated with the crosscountry decline in inflation and output volatility -what is sometimes called the Great Moderation -or with greater risk-management on the part of financial institutions.
Alternatively, attention has been directed to the demand by pension funds for long-term assets, or foreign central bank purchases of Treasury assets.
1 Regardless of the merit of such arguments, we think it of interest to determine whether the previously extant correlations hold in the more recent period.
The paper is organized in the following fashion. In section 2, we lay out a framework for examining what determines the long term interest rate relative to the short, and relate that to the extant literature on the yield curve as a predictor of future economic activity. In section 3, we describe the data and the empirical tests we implement. In Section 4, we repeat the exercise, but using as a dependent variable a binary dependent variable called "recession".
Section 5 concludes.
Background

Theoretical Framework
Following previous literature, this paper focuses on the yield spread defined as the 10-year government bond yield less the 3 month treasury yield (or closest equivalent for countries other than the United States) 2 .
The linkage between the long-term and short-term interest rates can be decomposed thus:
2 Using aggregate Euro area data, Moneta (2003) found that the 10-year/3-month spread specification performed better than any other pair of yield maturities that included two of the following: 3-month, 1-year, 2-year, 5-year, 10-year.
n t e n t e t t n t l n
Where n t i is the interest rate on a bond of maturity n at time t ,is the expected interest rate on a one period bond for period j t  , based on information available at time t , and n t l is the liquidity (or term) premium for the n-period bond at time t . This specification nests the expectations hypothesis of the term structure (EHTS) (corresponding to the first term on the right hand side of equation 1), and the liquidity premium theory (corresponding to the second term).
The EHTS posits that the yield on a long-term bond is the average of the one period interest rates expected over the lifetime of the long bond. The liquidity premium theory allows that there will be supply and demand conditions that pertain specifically to bonds of that maturity. The presence of idiosyncratic effects associated with a certain maturity of bond is sometimes linked to the "preferred habitat theory", the idea that certain investors have a preference for purchasing assets of specific maturities. Since 0  n t l and is expected to rise as n becomes large, the yield curve will slope upward when short rates are expected to be constant over time. Now, for the sake of simplicity, consider the case where 0  n t l (i.e., the EHTS explains all variation in long rates). Suppose further expected short rates are lower than the short rate 3 Hamilton and Kim (2002) find that short term interest volatility determines the term premium, but not economic activity.
today. Then the long rate will be lower than the short rate (i.e., the yield curve inverts). Since low interest rates are typically associated with decreased economic activity, an inverted yield curve should imply an expected downturn, especially given that 0  n t l , then an inversion should imply a downturn a fortiori.
Why should short interest rates be lower during an economic downturn? The reasoning follows two -not necessarily mutually exclusive --avenues. The first is that decreased economic activity decreases private sector demand for credit; at the same time the monetary authority is likely to have decreased the policy rate in response to the slowdown. The second is that the monetary authorities raise rates that precipitate the subsequent slowdown.
Selective Literature Review
The literature on the usefulness of the yield spread in forecasting future growth is extensive and we review only a subset of the analyses here. Some early studies regarding the relationship between growth and the yield spread date to the late 1980s: Harvey (1988 Harvey ( , 1989 , Watson (1989), Nai-Fu Chen (1991) , Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) among others, suggested that an inverted yield curve (in this case a negative yield spread) could signal an impending recession. These early studies were primarily conducted using U.S. financial data to predict future Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth.
Subsequent research focused on whether the relationship between the yield spread and future economic growth held up in countries other than the United States. Harvey (1991) , Davis and Henry (1994) , Plosser and Rouwenhorst (1994) , Bonser-Neal and Morley (1997) , Kozicki (1997) , Estrella and Mishkin (1997) and Estrella, Rodrigues and Schich (2003) examined non-US OECD countries using post-1970 data, and generally conclude that the yield spread can be used to some extent in predicting future economic growth. However out-of-sample studies conducted by Davis and Fagan (1997) and Smets and Tsatsaronis (1997) using, respectively, U.S.
and German data, and European data, found that parameter estimates are unstable over time.
Moreover, the estimated regressions exhibited poor forecasting performance.
While the most simple model requires only a single-variable specification with the yield spread as the lone independent variable, some subsequent research allows for additional variables, such as the short term policy rate --at least when predicting recessions (as opposed to growth). One prominent example of this approach is Wright (2006) . In his paper, Wright argues that adding the short-term rate strengthens the in-sample forecasting results when using a probit model to predict recessions.
Empirical Model and Results
Data
The compilation of the dataset confronts the researcher with many choices, including the set of countries to study, and the choice of both regressors and regressand. We opted to select countries in order to adequately represent the Euro Area. Countries outside the Euro Area provide a basis of comparison to provide perspective and sense of robustness regarding the results.
In addition, to ensure the interest rates represent market-determined rates, we selected countries that have robust and liquid financial markets. The need for a sufficiently large time sample (1970 ( -September 2009 ) further restricted the set of countries we could examine.
Given these constraints, we restrict our analysis to Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In addition, we estimate an aggregate Euro Area specification using data from 1990-2009.
We select industrial production as our measure of economic activity. While GDP is the broadest indicator of economic activity, the use of industrial production presents some substantial advantages in terms of timeliness and reliability. 5 In any case, growth rates of industrial production tend to follow GDP closely 6 . All of the countries in the data set (including the Euro Area) report industrial production at a monthly frequency while GDP is reported at a quarterly frequency; using IP therefore affords us a larger data set.
In-sample Results
We start with a simple bivariate model:
4 For Italy and the Netherlands, the data begin in 1971 and 1972 respectively.
5 By reliability, we mean that the industrial production series do not get revised as significantly as GDP. 6 For instance, the correlation between GDP and IP growth in the US and UK are .76 and .72 respectively. In words, the yield spread at time t predicts the annual growth rate of industrial production from time t to time period k t  months. We examine this model with k equal to 12 and 24 (i.e. growth over a one and two year time horizon). Since adjacent year over year growth figures will be drawing from overlapping data points, the resulting error terms will be serially correlated. To account for this serial correlation, we conduct our statistical inferences using heteroscedasticity and serial correlation robust standard errors. 7 We turn first to the results from the model using the complete interest rate data set , displayed in table 1. All countries exhibit a significant slope parameter over the one year forecast horizon, suggesting the yield spread may hold some forecasting value. The magnitude of the parameter estimate is also economically significant. For example, the slope coefficient of 1.38 for France implies that for each percentage point increase in the yield spread, French industrial production growth will increase by 1.38 percentage points over the subsequent year. Figure 2 displays the estimated slope coefficients for all countries in the data set. These coefficients vary markedly across countries, ranging from a high of 1.85 in Canada to a low of 7 We have investigated whether the variables are stationary or not. Unit root tests indicate that the spreads and industrial production changes are stationary. 0.75 in the Sweden. A Chow test confirms the fact that the relationship between the yield spread and economic growth is not identical across countries.
Despite the existence of statistically significant parameter estimates in each country, the goodness of fit for the model (according to the R-squared statistic), varies substantially across country models. That being said, the relative proportion of variation across countries is of interest. The yield spread in United States, Germany, France and Canada explains more than 20 percent of the changes in annual industrial production growth. In contrast, the yield spread explains less than 10% of the variation in output in Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden.
Following Bonser-Neal and Morley (1997) and Kozicki (1997) , we also examine the corresponding specification for growth over a two year horizon. While many of the variables are still significant, the explanatory power of the model deteriorates for many countries.
Additionally, in every case the magnitude slope coefficient is smaller in the two-year model relative to the one-year model. The decrease in explanatory power and magnitude of the coefficient estimates at the two-year versus one-year horizon suggests most of the explanatory power is concentrated at the shorter horizon.
8 Figure 3 displays the goodness of fit according to the R-squared coefficient across countries over one and two-year growth forecast horizons.
Only the German, United Kingdom and United States models exhibit better fit in the two-year model relative to the one-year model. 8 For an empirical investigation into this issue see Kozicki (1997) .
In order to investigate the time variation in the strength and nature of the yield curve/growth relation, we split the sample at 1997/98. The choice of that specific date is primarily pragmatic in nature; it sets each subsample to be roughly similar in size. At the same time, the choice is somewhat fortuitous, as the latter subsample then conforms approximately to the post-EMU period. Tables 2 and 3 One interpretation of the negative coefficient could be as follows: typically a central bank will lower the policy rate to stimulate the economy. To the extent that the long-term rate is less responsive to policy rates compared to short-term rates, a lowering of the policy rate is associated with an increase in the yield spread. When the policy rate hits zero and the central bank engages in quantitative easing to replace reductions in the policy rate, longer term interest rates fall. The result is a narrowing of the yield spread. If succesful, these lower longterm rates should spur the economy and future growth should be on the horizon. If this were the case, and if the only shocks hitting the economy were variations in the extent of quantitative easing, we would expect the relationship between the yield spread and future growth when the policy rate is at zero to be inverse to the reationship when the policy rate is positive. One obvious implication of the Japanese results is that, going forward, one might expect a degraded fit for the US yield curve/output relationship, given the fact that the effective Fed Funds rate has essentially hit zero.
Our results are consistent with those of Haubrich and Dombrosky (1996) and Dotsey (1998) that suggest that the relationship between the yield spread and future growth diminishes using data since 1985. The results of our analysis suggest that the relationship continues to deteriorate post 1997, but with a couple of exceptions.
Out-of-Sample results
Since we are interested in the forecasting power of the yield curve, in-sample fit is not necessarily the most relevant metric. Consider the prediction error at time t; this error is obtained using a fit obtained including observations realized after time t, and in this sense utilizes information that would not be available to a forecaster at time t.
One way to more clearly identify the forecasting power of a particular specification is by conducting an out-of-sample forecasting exercise. 10 Each yield spread observation is used to predict future growth with truncated data such that the only data used is data that existed prior to the observation. The parameter estimates from these recursive regressions are used to generate a series of fitted values for year-over-year growth for each country. We opt to compare the root mean square error (RMSE) criterion, and compare against a naïve forecast RMSE. In this case, our naïve forecast is a simple AR1 model of growth.
The results can be succinctly summarized. We conclude that there exists a marginal benefit to estimating a growth model with the yield spread (as opposed to the simple AR (1) model) if the RMSE from the yield spread model specification is less than that of the AR (1) model. Figure 5 displays the fitted values for the out-of-sample model, using the yield spread as the independent variable. While extreme fluctuations were not always well predicted, the general contours of the growth rate series seem to be captured in many cases. However, none of the models, including those that outperformed the AR1 models, were able to predict the most recent contraction in industrial production.
Results relative to the AR(1) model across all countries were mixed. Table 4 displays the results of the RMSE scores for both model specifications. Three of the nine country models scored lower RSME from the yield curve specification as opposed to the AR(1) model, while the remaining five increased. Two of the three yield curve models exhibiting lower RMSE than the AR(1) models were European countries. In terms of statistical significance, in only one caseGermany -did the yield curve outperform the AR(1) specification at the 10% msl, according to a Diebold-Mariano test.
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The relatively poor out-of sample results could, in part, be due to fundamental changes in the relationship between the yield curve and economic activity over time. If the structure of the relationship changed in the middle of our sample the forecasting power, coefficient estimates using historical data may not be useful in predicting growth out of sample. A number 11 In only one case did the yield curve perform significantly worse than the AR(1): Japan.
of events over the past ten years may have affected the predictive power of the yield curve including: the advent of the European monetary union, the "great moderation", the global savings glut and the Japanese experience with a zero lower bound policy rate. Each of these events affected different subsets of countries within our dataset. Therefore if we witness a simultaneous deterioration of predictive power across countries affected by the same event, it may suggest that that event was partially responsible for the observed deterioration. negative is what we would have expected as the short rate hits zero and the government attempts to lower long-term rates as well.
Marginal predictive value
In general, the simple univariate regression results suggest the yield curve does hold significant predictive power, especially when the sample includes many business cycles. Orders of Non-defense Capital Goods, and Stock Prices. Where exact matches were not available for a particular country, the most similar data series was used.
To represent the leading indicators we construct a single "factor" by applying principal component analysis to 12-month changes of five common leading index components. 14 The factor is defined to be the first principle component. Table 5 summarizes the results of these regressions. Due to data limitations of some leading indicators, the sample size for a number of countries has been reduced for this exercise.
Regardless, in nearly every case, results suggest the yield spread does contain information above and beyond other common leading indicators. The Netherlands is the sole exception; the small sample size may be contributing to the inconclusive results.
Leading indicator data in Canada, Japan and the United States span the original sample, beginning in 1970. For these countries coefficient estimates for the yield curve are little changed with or without the inclusion of the factor. The largest difference is manifested in the case of the United States, where the coefficient estimate on the spread drops from 1.6 to 1.2.
As expected, the constructed factor is also significant in explaining variation in industrial production growth in many countries, although the relationship appears to be weaker than that between the yield curve and growth.
Real-time data results
In the previous exercises we used historical data as they looked at the time. However industrial production data, as are most measures of economic activity, is subject to revision. 
The Yield Curve and "Recessions"
We now move to a nonlinear version of the same question we asked earlier, to the extent that recessions are a specific characterization of (negative) output growth. Following Montea (2003) and Wright (2006) , we test if the yield spread is a predictor of recessions, defined as a binary dependent variable.
There is little agreement in terms of the findings in the literature, especially in this crosscountry context. While Montea (2003) finds the yield curve alone is a useful predictor of recessions when using aggregate Euro area data, Wright (2006) argues there is no reason to believe that an increase in the short-term interest rate should have the same consequence as a decrease in the long term rate. Consequently, we augment the conventional recession/yield curve specification with the Federal funds rate to isolate the effect of changes in the short-term rate. Wright's model performed better when adding the Federal funds when using United States data. Following the literature, the models we use are as follows:
Where t is the current time period and k is the forecast period and     denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function. We use the 3-month interest rate to isolate the effect of movements in short-term interest rates. The recession indicator equals one if a given economy is in a recession for any month between 1  t through k t  , inclusive . We estimate both models using k equal to 6 and again with k equal to 12 (i.e. a six month and one year forecast).
In terms of our recession indicators, we use the NBER measure for the United States.
Since there are not comparable measures for the other countries, we use the recession indicator from the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI). Table 8 displays the results from the probit model estimates for each country. The first two columns are the results from a six-month forecasting horizon, while the third and fourth columns display the twelve-month forecasting results. The pseudo R-squared statistic (which does not penalize for increased model size) is shown as an indicator of goodness of fit.
Generally the models that include the short-term interest rate out-perform those that only include the yield spread.
For the United States, our results differ somewhat from the results obtained by Wright (2006) ; the yield spread parameter is significant over both the six-month and twelve-month forecasting periods. However, the 3-month interest rate parameter is statistically insignificant over either horizon. Additionally, we do not see a significant increase in goodness of fit when adding the short-term rate.
The results from the Germany model are very similar to the United States model: model performance improves very little when adding the short-term interest rate and the short-term interest rate parameter is not statistically significant. Interestingly, results for the remaining countries outside the United States are starkly different. Across many other non-US countries, adding the short term rate to the model reduces both the magnitude and significance of the yield spread, while increasing the overall goodness of fit. In Canada, Sweden and the United Kingdom the short-term rate is statistically significant while the yield spread coefficient actually becomes statistically insignificant. The most dramatic instance of this is the Canada where the magnitude of the t-statistic for the yield spread parameter declines from negative 5 to just negative 0.5 when adding the short-term rate in the six-month forecast; at the same time the pseudo R-squared statistic jumped from 0.31 to 0.48. In all countries excluding Japan, the coefficient on for the short-term interest rate is positive, suggesting high relative short-term interest rates precede periods of slower growth.
We display in Figure 7 the estimated probabilities of recession in the subsequent 6 months using only the yield spread, and both the yield curve and 3-month interest rate.
Generally speaking recessions were well predicted by the yield curve across countries in the 1970s and 1980s. When we look at recessions in the 1990s and 2000s however, results are less consistent. Across most countries recessions earlier in the data set were predicted better when including the short-term interest rate level whereas more recent recessions tend to be better predicted with the yield spread alone. While this stylized fact may be indicative of a structural change in the relationship between interest rates and future economic activity, it could also be due to the decline in short-term interest rate volatility relative to the decline in yield spread volatility since 1995. rate actually produced a higher probability of recession then the model including both the yield spread and the short-term interest rate. These outcomes suggest something may have been structurally different about the recessions of the 2000s. It is tempting to speculate on the impact of Economic and Monetary Union on this phenomenon, since the 2001 recession is the first one occurring when the ECB was setting short term rates, and long rates had converged to relatively small differentials.
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The results for Japan are unique. When using only the yield spread as in independent variable, the yield curve coefficient is not statistically significant. When adding the short-term interest rate, both coefficients become highly significant and the explanatory power of the model increases markedly. Additionally, the sign of the short-term interest rate coefficient is negative, indicating that lower relative short-term interest rates tend to precede times of slower growth in Japan.
Conclusion
This paper has explored the importance of the yield spread in forecasting future industrial production growth and recession. Overall, when using the entire data series from 1970-2009, in-sample results suggest the yield spread is indeed important and has significant predictive power when forecasting industrial production growth over a one-year time horizon. The results 18 Note that CEPR, using a methodology reminiscent of NBER's, did not declare a recession for this period. See CEPR at http://www.cepr.org/data/Dating/info1.asp .
deteriorate when forecasting growth two years ahead. Moreover, it appears that the predictive power of the yield curve for subsequent one-year growth is much weaker in the last decade.
However, four out of six European country models exhibited relatively high R-squared statistics (above 0.1) when using data from 1998-2009, and for two countries (Italy and Sweden) the proportion of variation actually increased. While the explanatory power is somewhat less for certain models estimated over the 1970-1997 data, the data still suggest the yield curve might possess some forecasting power for European countries. The marked deterioration of the significance in the Japan model when using data corresponding to Japan's period of zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) might presage a weakening of the significance of the relationship in the United States, given the effective Federal funds rate has reached the zero lower bound.
The results we obtained in the out-of-sample forecasting exercises were less convincing.
Of the European countries examined, only for Germany and the United Kingdom did the yield curve possess greater predictive power than a simple AR(1). Certainly the relationship between the yield spread and growth has declined in recent years; however it appears that the relationship has held up best in some European countries and may have strengthened with the increasing volatility of macroeconomic data over the past two years.
In terms of in-sample explanatory power, the yield curve appears to have predictive power for one year ahead industrial production, even after accounting for other variables that have predictive power. We obtain this result by augmenting the yield curve regression with a factor based upon five variables that are typically used in leading indicators.
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The contrast across countries was marked for the probit models. The short-term rate was significant in several instances; however inclusion of the short-rate often resulted in a decrease in the economic and statistical significance of the yield spread. The model predicted recessions relatively well for the US, Germany and Sweden over the entire data set while the remaining models largely failed to anticipate the recessions of the 2000s. The Japanese case is distinct from all the others. Low short-term rates appear to precede future economic slowdown and the model performs very poorly without the short-term rate.
In other words, we do not obtain a simple story for the yield curve's predictive power.
The yield curve clearly possesses some forecasting power. However, there is also some evidence the United States is something of an outlier, in terms of its usefulness for this purpose. And overall, the predictive power of the yield curve seems, with some notable exceptions, to be declining over time. Goodness of Fit (R-squared) 1970-2009 1970-1997 1998-2009 Figure 5
Figure 6
Estimated yield curve coefficient with 95% confidence band. 
